Cross-border trade remains a contentious issue in the restructuring of the European electricity market. Difficulties stem from the lack of a common market design, the separation between energy and transmission markets and the insufficient coordination between Transmission System Operators (TSOs). This paper analyzes the cross-border trade problem through a set of models that represent different degrees of coordination both between the energy and transmission markets and among national TSOs. We first present the optimal organisation, not implemented in Europe, where energy and transmission are integrated according to the nodal price paradigm and Power Exchanges (PXs) and TSOs are integrated. This is our reference case. We then move to a more realistic representation of the European electricity market based on the so-called market-coupling design where energy and transmission are operated separately by PXs and TSOs. When considering different degrees of coordination of the national TSO... 
Introduction
Experience indicates that the restructuring of the electricity sector towards competition is more complicated than foreseen. Specifically while the application of first economic principles on Kirchhoff's laws tells us that electricity should be differentiated by location and hence that the energy and transmission markets should be integrated, the argument that this makes the market unnecessarily complicated has been widely advocated. The pressure for market organizations based on a coarse geographic differentiation of the product has thus been considerable. Similarly the lack of storability of electricity suggests the need for a very strong coordination among all agents involved in the market. Here again the argument has been that this departs too much from normal market operations, leading to a considerable pressure to retain as much decentralization in the market as possible. This joint pressure for a loose geographic differentiation of electricity prices and a rather decentralized organisation of the energy and transmission markets has been encountered throughout the world. It is also present in Europe where the problem is made more acute by the legal requirement to construct a single electricity market.
These difficulties have been particularly striking in the organisation of cross-border trade among Member States that stakeholders have now been discussing since more than 10 years. This paper attempts to model different market organisations inspired by these discussions and the possibilities offered by the third legislative package (see [6] ) to introduce multinational Transmission System Operators (TSO) to deal with congestion issues.
It has now been abundantly argued both on the basis of theory and successful restructuring experiences that electricity markets should rely on an organization where transmission and energy clear simultaneously at spatial level. This system is now implemented in the restructured part of the US electricity market. The model accounts for the physical properties of the electricity commodity and the characteristics of the grid. We refer to this situation as Model 1 and take it as our benchmark. From an economic point of view, Model 1 represents a complete market where all spatial arbitrage opportunities allowed by the physical constraints of the grid are traded away.
While this type of market exists and is operated successfully in different regions of the world, it is not accepted in Europe. The most sophisticated organisation of cross border trade in the continental European electricity market is known as Market-Coupling (MC) (see Belpex web site). It is currently operated between Belgium, France and The Netherlands and should soon be extended to the Western border of Germany. This organisation can be described as follows. TSOs provide the national PXs with a simplified representation of the network that is meant to represent its transmission possibilities. The PXs then clear national and international energy markets within the simplified representation of the grid. Because the resulting power trades are not necessarily feasible for the real network, TSOs undertake "counter-trading operations" in order to re-balance the flows and make them compatible with physical grid constraints.
We refer to this problem as Model 2 when all TSOs act in a fully integrated way to manage network congestion. By using a simplified description of the grid, Model 2 misrepresents spatial arbitrage possibilities and organizes an incomplete market.
The current organisation of market-coupling is different and may still evolve. The situation today is that each TSO manages congestion on its national grid with multilateral arrangements controlling congestion on the interconnections. Because of loop flows, the actions of each TSO or group of TSOs have an impact on the network of the other TSOs. We refer to this situation as Model 3 of which we consider different views. These view are inspired by the third legislative package that allows for multinational TSOs, that is TSOs that cover several countries. Model 3 further degrades the situation compared to Model 2 by organizing an incomplete transmission market.
All real world markets have some degree of inefficiencies and it is not certain ex ante that those embedded in Models 2 and 3 are serious, at least if one neglects the incentive to game counter-trading operations as we do here. It all depends on the particular situation on hand, that is, on the capacities of the grid and the structure of generation and demand. These things can only be appreciated by numerical testing. We introduce these models on a stylized example (see [1] for the mathematical details) and apply them on a small prototype model of the pentalateral market where market-coupling is currently developed (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands).
Surprisingly we find that the lack of formal coordination of the counter-trading operations embedded in Model 3 can be partially substituted by a competitive access to counter-trading resources. In other words an internal market of counter-trading resources can in principle restore some of the efficiency that the lack of integration of the TSOs normally entails. While this is a weaker requirement than a full integration of the TSOs, it is still demanding. We show that quantitative limitations to the access 4 of these resources effectively decreases the efficiency of counter-trading.
The problem treated here arises from the need to spatially differentiate electricity in a grid constrained market. The so-called RTO or ISO organisation that now prevails in several regions of the US recognizes the need for a tight integration of the energy and transmission operations. This model (that we stylize in Model 1) is now well understood; it is briefly recalled in Section 2 together with Chao and Peck (1998, see [2] ) six node example that serves to support the conceptual discussion in Sections 3 and 4. Europe is pursuing a different approach 1 . "Market-coupling" (MC) is today the most advanced European arrangement of cross-border trade. It supposes that national PXs clear the multi-area energy market on the basis of a simplified ATC (available transmission capacity) description of the grid and leaves it to the TSOs to tackle the resulting congestions. We describe the energy market clearing part of MC in Section 3. While an integrated European TSO would be in the best position to tackle the congestions resulting from the clearing of the energy market Europeans are still hesitant as to the degree of integration of transmission that they want to implement. Section 4 examines different possibilities for organizing counter-trading operations and discusses the unintended but positive impact that some of these methods can have. Section 5 introduces a stylized case study that is then elaborated in Section 6. Conclusion terminates the paper. An example of a two zones market is depicted in Figure 2 for the six node example.
There exists two PXs, one for each zone; the imports/exports from one zone to the 6 other are capped by some transfer limit which here represents the grid. This limit is an Available Transmission Capacity (ATC). The computation of the ATC and more generally the construction of the simplified representation of the grid by the TSOs go beyond the scope of this paper. The zonal PX clears the domestic market for given imports and exports. The different zonal PXs also simultaneously clear the crossborder energy market by playing on imports and exports in a way that accounts for the ATC between the zones. All in all, we can assume that the two zonal PXs operate in a coordinate way, as if they were just one PX, and their actions can be modelled as resulting from a welfare maximization conducted on all geographic zones and subject to the sole ATC constraints. Counter-trading can be organized in different ways: one possibility is for TSOs to jointly remove overflows at minimal cost. Another possibility is to have TSO "cooperate" in a more or less formalized way. Counter-trading has a cost which must be charged to the agents of the energy market. We compute this cost but do no examine here its impact on energy trade. We use the six node example to illustrate different degrees of coordination. In contrast with full coordination which is an unambiguous notion, there are many ways to think of imperfect coordination. The discussion that follows is thus by nature illustrative. Our final goal however is to characterize the lack of coordination in a quantitative way.
Let q i be the vector of injections and withdrawals of the market equilibrium of the PX's welfare maximization problem obtained on the ATC network depicted in Figure   2 . Assume, for the sake of the discussion, that the flows resulting from these q i violate the capacity of lines (1-6) and (2-5) of the real network in Figure 1 . TSOs can act on line flows by purchasing incremental or decremental generation or consumption of electricity ∆q i . This means that quantities produced (or consumed) can be shifted from one producer (or consumer) to another. These adaptations must be limited though. First, they should be feasible (not exceed plant capacity or lead to negative consumption or generation). Second, changes of generation should net out to zero for each TSO; similarly changes of consumption should net out to zero for each TSO. We introduce more or less coordinated ways of conducting this task.
Let TSO N and TSO S be the two TSOs in charge of the Northern and the Southern zones respectively. A first assumption discussed in Section 4.1 is to suppose that TSO N and TSO S jointly solve a unique optimization problem to minimize the total cost of removing the overflows resulting from the q i . The alternative is to suppose that TSO N and TSO S separately act to remove line overflows taking into account the actions of the other. This leads to a Nash equilibrium problem. 
Model 2: Integrated counter-trading
Integrated counter-trading is achieved when the TSOs of both zones operate jointly to remove line overflows at minimal cost. Note that TSO N and TSO S take as given the quantities q i that result from the clearing of the energy market by MC. The model is an optimization problem (see the companion paper [1] ): each TSO is in charge of buying and selling counter-trading services in its own area 2 at minimal cost, but the optimization is joint. It gives a single price for each counter-trading resource as well as for each congested line.
Model 3: Coordinated and uncoordinated countertrading
As indicated above one can conceive of different imperfectly coordinated countertrading in different ways. We discuss the economic effects of different approaches in this section.
Implicitly coordinated counter-trading: version 1 of Model 3
We first assume that each TSO acts independently to manage congestion on the interconnections, taking the actions of the other TSO as given. We further assume that each TSO can buy counter-trading services in both zones. This means that, differently from the case described in Section 4.1, both TSOs can trade at each node. We note the actions undertaken by the TSOs as ∆q N i=1,...,6 and ∆q S i=1,..., 6 . The network remains the common good shared by the TSOs but the absence of coordination may induce them to assign different values to the congested lines. The plurality of values is the source of a market incompleteness that can degrade the transmission market. In economic terms, this problem is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE). This problem generally has several solutions leading to different values implicitly assigned to the interconnections (see [1] ).
The surprising effect of the situation is that, even in absence of full coordination, we find that the two TSOs have no choice but assigning the same value to the common transmission constraints. This has an economic interpretation. The model assumes as if counter-trading were operated in an integrated way. The mathematical implication is that the solution of the GNE is the solution of the associated Nash Equilibrium, which differs from the GNE by assuming a market for the congested flowgates. The policy implication is that it does not hurt to keep separate TSOs if there is free access to global counter-trading resources. As we shall see this free access is required for the results to hold.
Uncoordinated counter-trading: version 2 of Model 3
The above model assumes that both TSOs can resort to all counter-trading resources on an equal basis. TSO N has no priority on Northern resources compared to TSO S .
This sets a single price of counter-trading for the two TSOs and hence indirectly insures the coordination of their activities. It is unlikely in practice that all TSOs would have equal access to all counter-trading resources. We therefore consider an alternative case where we suppose that TSO N has limited access to the Southern resources and conversely. More specifically, we assume that TSOs only have limited access to countertrading resources in other control areas and specify a bound on this access. A TSO that hits its quota in another jurisdiction therefore faces a scarcity rent that cannot be arbitraged away with the other TSO. Because counter-trading resources are now priced differently, the value assigned by the TSOs to the congested lines also differ and the perfect coordination is lost. This makes counter-trading inefficient.
Uncoordinated counter-trading: version 3 of Model 3
The limit case is the one where a TSO can only access the counter-trading resources of its own area and acts taking the actions of the other as given. This creates line valuation differences that cannot be arbitraged away. This destroys all possibilities of coordination and increases inefficiencies in counter-trading. base load demand. Our focus is however not on the distinction between peak and base demand but on the geographical differentiation of electricity demand and generation.
A wholesale reference price of 40 e/MWh is applied as well as an elasticity of -0.1 in the reference point. Our simulations are calibrated with data updated to 2005.
Demand data are provided by Eurostat while generation capacities come from the public reports of the power companies included in the model.
A PX and a TSO operate in each of the four modeled countries. They are integrated into a single pool in the reference "nodal model". Following European practice, they remain separated entities in the other cases. In line with the design of "marketcoupling" we assume that an equilibrium mechanism links all PXs so that they behave in an integrated way as if there were a unique PX operating on a simplified network.
On the contrary, TSOs can organize their activities in different ways as we explain in the following.
Modelling and results
We construct several models that correspond to different multinational TSO arrange- 
Model 1: The full integration of energy and transmission
All PXs and TSOs are integrated in a single entity. This is the standard "nodal system" (which is here effectively a zonal system because of data limitation). It avoids what
Hogan calls "the fallacy of separation" and corresponds to Joskow's "textbook" model (see [5] ). There is a single physical model of the grid, which is the one depicted in 
Sensitivity analysis
We also conduct a simple sensitivity analysis on Model 1 by modifying the values of the reference demands used to calibrate the demand functions. We find that increases of the reference electricity demands by 5, 10 and 20% respectively lead to social welfares of 279,254,121,514 e, 291,080,340,843 e and 313,591,708,405 e.
The energy market in the "market-coupling" of Models 2 and 3
Models 2 and 3 separate the PXs and the TSOs. This falls into the "fallacy of separation" and departs from the successful "textbook" approach (see [5] ). Following the principle of market-coupling we assume a different PX in each of the four markets but suppose that market clearing takes place on a geographic basis described by the ATC network of Figure 4 operations imply re-dispatching costs that decrease the social welfare by 4 Million e/year (-0.0015%) compared to Model 1. This is reported in Table 1 . This loss of welfare is the price to pay for the separation of the energy and transmission markets.
This price is here small: averaging the cost of counter-trading on the whole load of the region leads to a value of 0.374 e/MWh. 
Model 3.1 : A trilateral TSO (F-B-NL)
The sole congestion on interconnections between France and Belgium and Belgium Similar outcomes are reported in Table 4 where we consider a symmetric scenario where the (F-B) TSO has limited access to the re-dispatching resources in Belgium.
In this case, the value "898" in the first column of the This is equivalent to a welfare loss of 2.9 billion e/year; a figure that is considerably higher than what was observed before. Moreover, the average re-dispatching cost in
The Netherlands is quite high (35.67 e/MWh). In Belgium, this average is lower (4.32 e/MWh), but still higher than the values encountered in the previous scenario. Note that there are no re-dispatching costs in France and in Germany (see Table 5 ). Congestion problems remain on interconnections and Belgium and The Netherlands where national TSOs handle them at the above mentioned costs.
Re-dispatching costs (e/MWh) G F B NL 0.00 0.00 4.32 35.67 Table 5 : Average re-dispatching costs
The conclusion of an impossible removal of line overflows by the four TSOs acting independently may look unrealistic. Even if an illustrative case study cannot pretend to realistic data and hence realistic results, most will argue that this outcome is too excessive to be meaningful. We conclude by explaining that it is in fact quite plausible. 
Conclusion
These formulations provide different insights into what TSO cooperation can bring to the internal electricity market. The integration of the energy and transmission is the paradigm of efficiency. We also find that MC with an integrated TSO (Model 2)
can be reasonably efficient if agents do not take advantage of that separation to game the counter-trading market. Interestingly we also find that multilateral arrangements where different TSOs procure counter-trading resources on the same terms can partially substitute full coordination. This result is attractive but still requires an internal market of counter-trading resources. These should be available to all TSOs without price discrimination or restriction of access. Any limitation of the recourse to these resources, whether resulting from regulatory measures or just pure economics (e.g. the French TSO not resorting to German resources because it is not economic to do so) jeopardizes the coordination result, therefore leading to a more costly counter-trading.
The most striking results is the impact of uncoordinated counter-trading. Independent
TSOs can only manage the congestion resulting from MC with a drastic increase of network capacities. In practice, this means that independent TSOs effectively manage congestions by drastically restricting the possibilities of the grid compared to what could be done with a more integrated solution.
One should note in closing that we adopted a very optimistic view on countertrading resources. We supposed that all resources available to the energy markets are also available for counter-trading. This is unrealistic and should be adapted when moving from an academic illustrative study to a real analysis.
